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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 378 
Accident time: 12:58 Accident Date: 20/05/2002 
Where it occurred: M/F 149, Bal'awin, 
Bayt Yahun 
Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 25/07/2002 
ID original source: BOI:No003/2002 Name of source: MACC SL 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: No.4 Israel AP blast / 
frag 
Ground condition: grass/grazing area 
hard 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 22/02/2004 Date  last modified: 23/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: M/F 149 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
A summarised MACC BOI report was made available in 2003. It is reproduced below, edited 
for anonymity. The commercial demining company involved was asked to supply the internal 





1.  At the time of the accident [Commercial demining company] Manual Clearance Team No.5 
were operational at the  M/F 149 clearance site, at Bal’awin, Bayt Yahun. Manual Clearance 
Team No.5 had been operational on M/F 149 and the adjacent M/F 256, since the 09th May 
2002. A total of 4 x breaching lanes 1 x M/F to M/F cut lane and 1 x main clearance lane had 
been cut into M/F 149 and M/F 256 during the previous 8 x days clearance activities, resulting 
in the location of the minefield mine rows, as per the M/F records 
2.  A [Commercial demining company] Deminer had been clearing a cut line in an uphill 
Northerly direction, from M/F 256 through to M/F 149. At a distance of approximately 100m 
from the Northern limit of M/F 256, the Deminer successfully cut into the Southern part of M/F 
149, locating a total number of 9 mines. 
3.  At approximately 12:55 hrs, the [Commercial demining company] Deminer located the 
tenth Israeli No.4 Anti-Personnel (AP) mine of the day. The mine had been located in 
between 2 x rocks, at a depth of approximately 3cms, in an angled position of approximately 
45 degrees and with the rear portion of the mine facing uppermost. The Deminer had 
excavated a large portion of the mine body, but not the actual mine fuze which would have 
been facing in a downward attitude. Following this partial excavation, he then informed the 
Team Leader who then ordered the Deminer to move to the rear of the lane into the safe 
area, whilst full excavation and manual neutralisation of the mine took place. 
4.  The Team Leader then adopted the kneeling position wearing his protective jacket and 
protective visor (down position). As the soil in and around the fuze was hard and in order to 
gain full access so that fuze neutralisation could take place, he chose to move the second 
smallest rock (farthest rock). Prior to moving the rock he probed underneath it, checking for 
booby-traps, he then attempted to physically move the rock, whereupon an uncontrolled 
detonation occurred.  
 
Medical details 
5.  The Team Leader suffered traumatic amputations of both hands above the wrists, multiple 
facial cuts and abrasions to his face, a large fragmentation wound to his inner right thigh, 
primary and secondary fragmentation injuries to his groin, left thigh and left foot. The Team 
Medic administered medical treatment and stabilisation on-site; casualty evacuation by road 
to Bint Jubayl civilian hospital then took place.  
6.  On arrival at Bint Jubayl hospital, the Team Leader was transferred to the Emergency 
Department where additional trauma care was administered. As major surgery is not normally 
performed at Bint Jubayl hospital, the decision was then made to transfer the Team Leader to 
Hammoud hospital, Sidon. He then underwent a 3 ½ hour operation where upon after he was 
transferred to the Intensive Care Unit.  
 
Conclusions 
7.  Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the BOI concluded the 
following: 
• There was a surface detonation of an Israeli No.4 Anti Personnel mine. Evidence 
shows that the crater was relatively shallow, due to the locality of the mine at the time 
of detonation and the hard rocky ground that it was located in. No lifting had formed 
around the edge of the seat of detonation. 
• The mine detonated whilst the Team Leader was attempting to gain access to the 
fuze, and not during the actual neutralisation of the fuze. 
• The accident occurred just before the break for lunch (12:58hrs). 
• The Team Leader was in the kneeling position at the time of the uncontrolled 
detonation. 
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• The traumatic amputation of the Team Leader’s hands were due to the positive blast 
effects resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No.4 mine, on the detonation of 
the high explosives.  
• The Team Leader’s other injuries were sustained from both primary and secondary 
fragmentation, resulting from the disintegration of the Israeli No.4 mine, on the 
detonation of the high explosives.  
• The medical treatment and subsequent evacuation of the casualty by the Team 
Medic was very good 
• The post-accident marking of the accident site was carried out in accordance with 
current SOPs. 
• The passage of information in between the accident site, [Commercial demining 
company] base location and the MACC SL was very good, with all relevant 
information being passed in a timely manner. 
• The BOI agrees with and accepts [Commercial demining company] Accident and 
IMSMA Reports. 
• The protective jacket maintained it’s integrity following the uncontrolled detonation of 
an Israeli No.4 AP mine, at a distance ranging from approximately 10 cms to 40 cms. 
• The protective visor did not maintain its integrity following the uncontrolled detonation 
of an Israeli No.4 AP mine, at a distance of approximately 40 cms, but provided 
sufficient protection to ensure that the Team Leader sustained no eye damage.  
 
8.  The BOI concluded that there are two possible explanations why there was an 
uncontrolled detonation, these being: 
• Whilst attempting to move the second rock, the Team Leader either inadvertently 
dropped the rock onto the mine causing it to detonate, or inadvertently rolled the rock 
onto the mine causing it to detonate. 
• Whilst attempting to move the second rock, the Team Leader would have been 
stretching and leaning forward (consequently being in an unbalanced state), he 
therefore may have lost balance and placed both hands on top of the mine. 
9.  The BOI also concluded that the likelihood of the mine being booby-trapped is minimal, 
evidence to substantiate this are: 
• No booby-traps are detailed in the Israeli Minefield Report. 
• Due to the hard rocky soil, the setting of a booby-trap would have been extremely 
difficult. 
• No physical evidence of  booby-trapping was found during the BOI investigation. 
 
Recommendations 
10.  The following are recommendations based on the BOI conclusions: 
• All armed mines that incorporate a cocked striker mechanism are to be destroyed in-
situ. It is known that this accident and the previous accident (001/2002), occurred 
whilst Team Leaders were trying to gain access to the mine in order to neutralise the 
fuze. A recommendation following accident 001/2002 was that “All mines that prove 
difficult to excavate or neutralise are to be destroyed in-situ (by detonation only)”. 
Either clearance personnel are not adhering to this recommendation, or are finding it 
difficult to distinguish between what is difficult to excavate and what is not difficult to 
excavate! 
• The specific TSG related to this accident is to be reviewed by the MACC and 
recommendations made to the NDO for amendment immediately but not later than 31 
3 
July 2002.  The specific TSG to be reviewed is Chapter Four:  Mine Clearance 
Techniques. 
• The MACC is to propose an amendment to the National TSGs which provides clearer 
guidance on manual neutralization as an authorized mine clearance technique within 
the theatre of operations.  Should the company wish to employ a manual 
neutralization technique then they are to prepare their SOP and submit it in writing to 
the MACC QA Section for approval prior to implementing the procedure in the field.  
Until such time as these two issues are addressed the procedures detailed in 
National TSGs are to apply (Ref: NDO TSGs, Issued Mar 2002, Chapter 4, paras 
4.11-4.13, 4.15-4.17). 
• The current blanket restriction placed on the manual neutralization of all mines is 
withdrawn with effect the acceptance of this report by the NDO Representative, 
however, the techniques detailed in Chapter 4 of the TSGs are to apply until such 
time as the Company SOPs for manual neutralization are submitted and approved. 
• Team Medics are to ensure that all operational personnel drink sufficient quantities of 
liquids, and take regular breaks during demining operations, especially during times 
of hot weather (every 60 minutes as per National TSGs). 
• The density of the minefields in which the teams are working, the rocky and hard 
ground, and the working temperature on the day have all been contributing factors to 
this accident.  It is clear from the evidence that the injured Team Leader was not in 
the act of physically neutralizing the mine.  This has been an unfortunate accident 
and there can be no fault directly attributed to the Team Leader’s actions. 
• The conclusions detailed in this report be distributed and discussed among all 
[Commercial demining company] Operational Field Staff. 




Victim number: 495 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: no 
Compensation: Not made available 
(insured HMT) 
Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Frontal apron 
Protection used: Long visor; Frontal 
apron 
 










The Victim suffered unspecified groin injury. No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Victim inattention” because it is likely that the 
Victim slipped and initiated the mine by placing both hands on top of it. The secondary cause 
is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because the Victim was a member of the site 
management team and appears to have been breaching a previous MAC directive that no 
attempt should be made to disarm mines that were difficult to expose.   
The accident report is noted as “inadequate” because the “summarised” report does not 
include sufficient detail in critical areas. It is possible that the full report would correct these 
failings. The summarised report does not detail the damage to the visor and the Victim’s face 
– which are crucial to determining whether the visor was worn raised and whether the visor 
performed inadequately. The report does not specify the fuze type found on other mines in 
the area, so identifying which type of No.4 fuze was likely to have been involved in the 
accident. Further, the report “accepts” the internal investigation and IMSMA report without 
including them. And it does not refer to or include witness statements which can help when 
wanting to later assess and confirm the chain of events. 
The No.4 mine (Israel) contains 188g TNT as a main charge and testing indicates that a 5mm 
thick polycarbonate visor would not normally shatter when more than 30cm from such an 
initiation. Visors have broken when presented at an offset angle to the blast event, but that 
breaking is usually limited so that the visor ends up in several large pieces. If a stone 
shattered and the visor was sprayed with large stone pieces, that would have made a well-
made visor in good condition shatter. More detail in the report would have allowed an 
assessment of whether the visor performed adequately. 
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